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1. Introduction  
Climate change is anthropogenic - the product of billions of acts of daily consumption. 
That solutions need to be anthropogenic too is well accepted. Normally cast in the realms 
of finance and technology, suggested solutions often neglect the primal root of the 
problem: individual behavior. A broad amount of social-psychology scholarship has 
examined the barriers and drivers of individual behavior in relation to both adaptation 
and mitigation. This paper reviews some of its conclusions, and suggests policy areas that 
should be considered in devising appropriate interventions. Let’s start from what 
separates awareness, concern and action.  
2. Climate change and behavior change 
There are three main reasons why the drivers of human behavior are important for 
climate policy.  First, myriad private acts of consumption are at the root of the climate 
change challenge.  As consumers, individuals hold a reservoir of mitigation capacity.  
Roughly 40 percent of OECD emissions result from decisions by individuals—travel, 
heating, and food purchases.  U.S. households directly account for roughly 35 percent of 
national CO2 emissions - more in absolute terms than the entire U.S. industrial sector and 
any other country bar China. If adopted, existing efficiency measures for households and 
motor vehicles can allow energy savings of almost 30 percent— 11 percent of total U.S. 
consumption.
2  Second, individuals are the drivers of larger processes of change 
involving organizations and political systems.  Particularly in democratic countries, 
government action is the result of public pressures to act by citizens and voters. Third, 
policy decisions are taken by individuals subject to standard mental processes.  
So far, the debate about changing individuals’ behavior has focused on market 
mechanisms. Better pricing of energy and costing of scarce resources can indeed steer 
individuals away from carbon-intensive consumption, encourage them to preserve 
endangered habitats, and better manage eco-systems.  But the drivers of consumption 
behavior by individuals and groups go beyond prices. Many energy efficient technologies 
have been available for years.  “No-regret” investment decisions that yield benefits 
irrespective of climate change are available for both mitigation and adaptation. Improving 
building insulation, addressing water leakages, and limiting urbanization in flood-prone 
areas are good examples.  The trick is to grasp why adoption has not taken place.  
3. Concern does not mean understanding 
Global awareness of climate change has constantly increased without translating into 
individuals’ actions.
34 Indeed, together with “awareness, flying, driving, holidaying 
abroad and using household appliances have also increased globally.
5  What explains the 
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disconnect between perceptions and actions? Concern about climate change does not 
necessarily mean understanding of its drivers and dynamics, nor of the responses needed. 
Polls show that the public admits to remaining confused over climate change’s causes 
and solutions.
6  This “green gap” in public attitudes partly stems from how climate 
science is communicated and how our minds’ (mis)understand climate dynamics.
7  
Standard information-deficit models assume that if people “know,” they act differently.
8  
Public opinion is today exposed to considerable amounts of information on the causes, 
dynamics and effects of climate change. This information clearly increased concern, but 
did not necessarily lead to action.
9  Information can lead to misleading feelings of 
“empowerment” (you can change the course of nature; the fate of the world depends on 
switching the light and using less air conditioning) which then turns into ambivalent 
powerlessness when paired with more “realistic” messages.  Conveying a sense of 
urgency by stressing the unprecedented nature and scale of the problems implies a lack of 
available models to learn from, encouraging paralysis.
10  Similarly, playing up the multi-
stakeholder nature of adaptation is a reminder that the solution rests with no single actor, 
resulting in a generalized feeling of limited agency, helplessness, and disempowerment
11. 
This might explain why, in developed countries where information on climate change is 
more available, citizens are less optimistic about a possible solution.  
To lead to action, awareness needs to be grounded in information from clear and 
trustworthy sources. Scientific debate evolves through testing and crosschecking of 
theories and findings. This can lead news coverage to veer from one extreme to another, 
resulting in additional confusion for the public, who may perceive this not as scientific 
progress but as a proliferation of contradictory opinions.  Media framing can be 
confusing or even misleading.12  The journalist’s need to present “balanced” stories has 
given disproportionate coverage to climate science contrarians lacking comparable 
scientific expertise and standing.13 The message can also contribute to enabling or 
disabling the possibility of action. The media shy away from the scientific community’s 
careful wording to express uncertainty in search of punchier stories.  The reader then 
faces messages lacking scientific caution and containing strong appeals that might be 
then refuted by other similarly strongly worded statements, hampering the perceived 
reliability of the information source. In addition to confusing the public (and 
policymakers) about import, causes, and potential solutions, different types of framing 
can antagonize individuals and induce a sense of guilt and vilification, as when the 
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problem of consumption turns into a problem of consumers.14  This can lead to rejecting 
the message, rather than acting upon it.   
An added challenge in moving from concern to understanding has to do with how the 
mind perceives the problem. The dynamics of climate change stretch our mental 
capacities in several ways.
15  Psychological research shows that individuals are ill 
equipped to deal with multiple-cause problems.
16  Simplifying by adopting single-cause 
explanations in turn leads to searching for individual solutions and focusing on (often 
nonexistent) easy technological silver bullets.  The inertia affecting adaptation responses 
can be linked to our incapacity to understand stock-and-flow relationships of the kind 
governing GHGs concentration, removal, and stabilization.  The fact that even the most 
drastic and sudden emissions reductions will not prevent further warming and make the 
need for adaptation disappear in the short and medium terms is something we struggle 
with, and without careful explanation, simply do not understand.
17   
4. Understanding does not lead to action 
Secondly, understanding does not always lead to action.  Knowledge is mediated through 
value systems shaped by psychological, cultural, and economic factors that determine 
whether we act or not.  Again, the idea here is not that individuals are not rational, but 
that we need to understand better how we make decisions.  Our evolution as a species has 
shaped the way our brains work and explains why we set priorities and act on certain 
issues and overlook others.  We are particularly good at acting upon threats that can be 
linked to a human face—that present themselves as unexpected, dramatic and immediate, 
rather than problems which emerge and develop slowly and gradually—that present 
obvious links to human health—that challenge our moral framework involving visceral 
reactions—that are spurred by recent personal experience.
18  The slow-changing quality 
of climate change, as well as the delayed, intangible, and statistical nature of its risks, 
simply do not “move us”.  
Behavioral economics shows that features of human decisionmaking under uncertainty 
tend to constrain our instinct to adapt.
19  We underestimate cumulative probabilities (the 
sum of the probabilities of an event occurring over a period of time), which explains why 
building continues in areas prone to fires, flooding, and earthquakes.  We strongly favor 
the status quo, and agree only to make small incremental adjustments to it.  We are at loss 
when the lack of a clear counterfactual makes measuring achievements difficult because, 
as in disaster preparedness. We are “myopic decisionmakers” who strongly discount 
future events to assign higher priorities to spatially and temporally closer problems.  For 
instance, the public tends to be mobilized by “visible” environmental problems (urban air 
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pollution) and not by less visible ones (groundwater pollution).  Sporadic events generate 
less concern than their probability warrants on average, but more than they deserve in 
those rare instances they occur (people get frantic if a bridge collapses, but neglect 
investing in maintenance).    These tendencies are confirmed by polls showing that 
individuals rank climate change lower than other environmental issues closer to home.
20   
Even if we were indeed fully rational, knowledge would not necessarily lead to action.  
  First, our “finite pool of worries” might prevent us from acting on existing 
information because we prioritize between a set of needs.
21 
  Second, we assess both market and nonmarket costs of our decisions. For individuals 
called on to engage with adaptation options challenge core value systems related, say, 
to traditional sources of livelihoods, culture, and identity (such as calls for 
resettlement and migration, or switching from traditional crops and farming customs 
to new climate-resilient agricultural practices).nonmarket costs can be high—
particularly when  
  Third, the very act of ‘interpreting’ or ‘mediating’ adaptation needs is costly.  To 
make rational decisions, individuals and communities facing adaptation choices incur 
transaction costs collecting and interpreting new and additional information.  For a 
household having to decide whether to keep rebuilding on a flood-prone area, these 
costs can be real and substantial.  The same can be said for a local authority official in 
charge of designing and enforcing building codes in low-lying coastal areas.  When 
the interpretation and decisionmaking costs are excessive, individuals can fail to act 
on available and already registered information.   
  Fourth, problems of mitigation—and, very often, adaptation—present themselves as 
tragedies of the commons requiring collective action.  Rational and self-interested 
individuals notably face structural disincentives to cooperate in solving these 
problems.
22   
  Fifth, game theory shows that cooperation in these conditions requires the payoffs to 
be clear, obviously not the case with climate change impacts and responses.
23  
Understanding barriers to behavior change also requires going beyond psychological 
explanations based on the individual as a unit of analysis and embrace the way social 
factors influence perceptions, decisions, and actions.  People naturally tend to resist and 
deny information that contradicts their cultural values or ideological beliefs, such as 
information challenging notions of belonging and identity, but also of rights to freedom 
and consumption.  Notions of “needs” and priorities deriving from them are socially and 
culturally constructed.
24 This might explain why awareness of environmental problems 
normally increases with levels of wealth, but not for concern about climate change.
25  
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Individuals (and nations) with higher incomes (and/or higher carbon dioxide emissions) 
seem to present a cognitive tendency to disregard global warming as a way to avoid 
incurring the costs of emissions.
26 
People also construct and reconstruct information to make it less uncomfortable, leading 
to strategies of socially organized denial that shape the way societies and governments 
interpret and respond to the challenges of climate change.
27  The evolution of standard 
narratives about climate change provides an example.  Focusing on country emissions 
rather than per capita emissions can lead individuals living outside the big emitters to 
minimize their own responsibility and rationalize their failure to act.  Drastic calls for the 
need for an international response tend to play down the fact that domestic action will be 
required in any case.  And uncertainty about dynamics and impacts can be overplayed to 
justified inaction.  
These forms of denial are not abstract.  Nor are they confined to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.  Similar processes operate at various levels of individuals’ 
day-to-day decisionmaking, and addressing them is part of solving crucial development 
challenges, such as reducing the spread of HIV-AIDS or the incidence of common water 
and sanitation related diseases.  Rather than an aberration, denial needs to be considered 
as a coping strategy deployed by individuals and communities facing unmanageable and 
uncomfortable events.  Forms of resistance to adaptation and mitigation choices are 
almost never simply the result of ignorance.  Instead, they result from individual 
perceptions, needs, and wants based on both material and cultural values.   
5. Encouraging behavioral change 
Policymakers need to be aware of these barriers to action, and treat policy options 
accordingly.  Three policy areas are relevant here:  communications, institutional 
measures, social norms.  
From information to communication.  Information, education, and awareness raising, as 
carried out so far, are at best not enough and at worst counterproductive.  Three 
recommendations for a different approach in coverage of climate change.
28  F i r s t ,  
creating the right communication opportunities and avenues to communicate requires 
more interaction between journalists and scientists.  Second, communicating climate 
change needs to shift away from an information-driven approach to a reader-centric one.  
Both scientists and the media need to work together on enhancing the salience of the 
messages they relay.  As in other policy areas, such as AIDS prevention, this entails using 
a “marketing” approach to communication, where the individual is not merely the passive 
receiver of information but an active agent in both causes and solutions.  Well designed 
climate communication campaigns that address individuals as members of a local 
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community—and not powerless members of an unmanageably large group—can 
empower them to act.  This can help make a long-drawn, global phenomenon personally 
relevant and immediately newsworthy and accentuate the local and individual ownership 
of the solutions local.  Third, greenwash from business and government—the gap 
between agreeing publicly on the reality of climate change while doing nothing about 
it—needs to be limited to avoid public confusion and public backlash.  
A key and controversial question is whether detailed public understanding of highly 
complex issues such as global warming is actually feasible, and even necessary, for 
effective policymaking.  The answer is no, or at least not always.  Much policymaking is 
based on technicalities fully ignored by the public.  Few people understand the intricacies 
of trade policies affecting the price of the food they buy and eat, or produce and sell.  
Where buy-in is necessary, it is often encouraged through other means.  
Yet discounting information and public awareness as unnecessary would be a mistake.  
Recent work has highlighted that information is key for the public to back costly 
measures.  The benefits of providing more accurate information about people’s 
consumption decisions—say, through carbon labeling and smart meters—have long been 
proven.  A US-based survey found that one of the main factors responsible for the 
public’s negative perceptions of cap and trade schemes is not fear of additional costs but 
rather limited knowledge of its effectiveness, reducing public trust in them.
29  Similarly, 
opposition to environmental taxes seems to decrease once the public fully understands 
that they are a way not simply to raise money, but to change behavior and reduce a 
negative externality.
30   
 Institutional measures.  Beyond communication, a key question for climate policy is to 
design interventions that take into account psychological and social constraints to 
positive action.  The design of effective adaptation interventions should include 
institutional measures reducing the transaction costs for individuals in making decisions 
while enhancing the ownership of the information available.  This would require adaption 
strategies to be informed by communities’ own perceptions of risk, vulnerability, and 
capacity.  The institutionalization of participatory self-assessments for national and local 
disaster preparedness, adaptation planning, and mitigation targets can be useful in this.  
Measures to limit individuals’ tendency to discount the future are another area of action. 
Although discounting the future is an innate and internal mental quality, it varies in 
accord with social characteristics and external stimuli.  Evidence from Peru shows higher 
discounting associated with higher incentives to deforest and lower incentives to invest in 
reforestation.  Farmers with limited access to credit and insurance and weak property 
rights security will have higher discount rates.
31  Institutional reforms aimed at improving 
credit access and property rights can affect inner behavioral drivers of discounting.  
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Similarly, interventions relying on individuals and businesses facing initial up-front costs 
with long-term benefits (such as those typical of energy efficiency investments) should 
consider the provision of immediate payoffs in the form of fiscal rebates or subsidies.  
Giving private actors a sense of long term policy direction  is also useful.  A 2007 
international survey of business leaders found that 81 percent of those polled believed 
that government needs to provide clear long-term policy signals to help companies find 
the incentives to change and plan investments.
32  (How government can ensure long-term 
direction is explored below.)  
Climate policy should also heed individuals’ tendency to favor local, visible, and 
privately securable outcomes.  Mitigation actions produce global and diffuse benefits.  To 
most, the benefits of adaptation are distant, abstract, and uncertain, while its actual and 
associated costs are usually immediate, concrete, and certain.  Interventions can be 
devised to better highlight upfront the ‘ancillary’ benefits.  For instance, altering cost-
benefit tools can encourage public and private decisionmakers to act more decisively.  
The estimation of costs and benefits of energy-efficiency projects often do not include 
nonenergy co-benefits. These include public health benefits from cleaner air and water, 
improved comfort of building occupants, increased labor productivity
33 and increased 
jobs through the multiplier effects of switching energy expenditure.
34  Evidence based on 
case studies in manufacturing concludes that these benefits can be considerable, and 
sometimes equivalent to the value of the energy savings alone.
35  The result is that the 
timeframe for investment paybacks can fall substantially, providing a better incentive to 
invest.  Similarly, earmarking revenues from carbon or energy taxes should be considered 
as a way to increase the visibility of benefits of mitigation.  Although fiscal earmarking is 
deemed to be economically inefficient, it helps achieve political acceptance of new taxes, 
because the public sees clearly where the money goes. 
Social norms.  Social norms are established patterns of behavior that most people approve 
of—or the yardstick individuals use to assess the appropriateness of their own behavior.  
As they shape human action, social norms can achieve socially desirable outcomes, 
generally at a fairly low cost.  The basic idea is that individuals want to act in a socially 
acceptable way.  We tend to follow the lead of others, particularly when the others are 
numerous and appear similar to them.  
Social norms have a particularly strong impact on recipients under conditions of 
uncertainty.
36  Rather than look for clues about how to behave when unsure about 
conduct and outcomes, people rely on what others do.  Evidence from different 
environmental contexts shows that social norm-based appeals for pro-environmental 
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behavior are superior to traditional persuasive appeals.  Littering is a good example of an 
act generally induced or restrained by group behavior.  
A more climate-relevant example comes from a psychological experiment conducted on 
California residents to check for the impact of social norms on energy consumption.
37  
The average household energy consumption was communicated to one group of high 
energy households and two groups of low energy households.  This set the social norm.  
One group of low-energy households received positive feedback for their energy 
consumption statement (a smiley), conveying approval of their energy footprint.  High 
consumption households were shown their energy use coupled with negative feedback 
(sad face) to convey disapproval.  The result was that high energy households reduced 
consumption, and low energy ones maintained their lower than average consumption.  
Importantly, the third group of low energy households who were initially exposed to the 
social norm, but received no positive feedback about their behavior, increased their 
consumption to reach the average.  
Harnessing the power of social norms implies increasing the “visibility” of behavior and 
its implications.  Individual decisions and actions that have a bearing on energy 
consumption today are largely invisible to the public and even to restricted circles of 
family and friends.  In these cases human agency cannot benefit from patterns of 
reciprocity, peer pressure and the group behavior normally at play in more visible cases 
of behavior change and compliance, such as in traffic control.  
Research on cooperation leads to the same conclusion. Unless information about other 
‘players’ behavior is available, people tend to ‘defect’ from cooperation.
38  Farmers in a 
specific river basin should be given information not only about their water use, but also 
whether they are below or above the standard set by their peers.  Residents of flood- 
prone areas can be encouraged to adopt protection measures by exposing them to the 
rapid uptake of such measures in their community.  Conversely, appeals stressing that too 
many people have not yet installed basic energy efficiency measures are bound to lead to 
even less, not more, adoption of such measures.   
The use of social norms has traditionally been neglected in public policy in favor of more 
standard measures, such as regulation, taxation, and pricing.  Thinking in terms of group 
behavior can help ameliorate the impact of these measures, opening opportunities for 
combining different instruments.  But some policies based on economic incentives might 
do more harm than good by weakening the effect of social norms.  Pricing pollution or 
emissions might give polluters the impression that they can pollute. Similarly, 
imperfectly enforced regulation, or perceptions that formal rules can be eluded, can break 
down the power of social norms in favor of more self-interested behavior and weaken 
cooperation.
39  
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More radical ideas about the potential use of social norms to address climate change call 
social norms focused on alternative parameters of progress, such as those stressing a shift 
toward notions of well being decoupled from levels of consumption.
40  Consumer-based 
incentives that reward positive behaviors rather than simply sanction bad ones have been 
suggested as a way to encourage such a shift.  For instance, a carbon foot print tax could 
be levied on consumer goods and products.  The revenue from such a tax would be 
equally rebated to consumers through a tax credit.  The tax would encourage producers to 
reduce the carbon footprint of their products.  High carbon consumers would pay a 
penalty, while low carbon users would end up better off because of the net effect of the 
tax rebate.  In addition to lowering carbon emissions directly, the carbon footprint would 
have an indirect effect on overall consumption.  As income is redistributed from (likely 
wealthier) high carbon users to (likely poorer) low carbon users, overall consumption 
aspirations will likely be lowered.
41  
These measures are obviously not sufficient to ensure the success of climate policy.  But 
they might well prove to be necessary.  Encouraging behavior change for mitigation and 
adaptation goes well beyond providing additional information, finance, or technology.  
Traditional measures can be completed by alternative types of interventions, often at low 
cost.  Rather than simply treat these social and psychological drivers of behavior as 
barriers to adaptation and mitigation, policymakers have the option to use them to build 
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